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With the arrival of a new American president in 2009, the power and constitutional
authority of the commander in chief to engage in military action remains as relevant
as ever. Barack Obama inherited a war in Iraq, has worked with the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization to initiate a 17,000 American combat troop surge in Afghanistan
in March 2009 and another increase of 30,000 personnel later that year, more than
doubling the total American presence. He also permitted American Navy Seals to
use force against Somali pirates in the first months of his presidency. In addition,
nuclear development and proliferation concerns in Iran and North Korea remain
ongoing diplomatic challenges for this administration, as well as the expanding
civil conflict in Pakistan. Moreover, if pressures increase for American military
intervention in Sudan’s humanitarian crisis or if the drug wars in Mexico continue
to expand, the United States will face even more questions over how and when to
engage American military forces abroad.
At the same time, the new commander in chief inherits a presidency from George
W. Bush that has been viewed as ‘imperial’ by many constitutional experts. This
legacy, which was evident well before the administration left office, was likely instrumental in generating new bipartisan interest in seeking a more balanced war powers
relationship between the commander in chief and the Congress. Most significantly,
the recommendations of the Baker-Christopher Commission in 2008 called upon
Congress to assert its constitutional war powers through a revision of the War
Powers Resolution, which has been viewed as a failure on many fronts.1 The commission’s recommendations have already been soundly criticized by a range of experts,
yet resulted in a number of congressional hearings in 2009, which suggests some
degree of public interest in reassessing the constitutional balance between the
commander in chief and Congress over the use of force abroad.2
This article seeks to explain the war powers political context of the Obama
presidency. The focus here is on when a president may use military force abroad,
rather than the broader range of powers that presidents may assert during wartime.
Given that most research agrees that the commander in chief has played the determining role in shaping how and when force is used abroad, the study begins with a short
overview of the war powers historical environment that the Obama administration
inherits, with a brief assessment of the legacy of the George W. Bush administration.
The paper then follows with an examination of President Barack Obama’s and
Vice President Joseph Biden’s previous views on war powers. In the context of the
modern presidency, and certainly since the Cold War’s end, Obama and Biden as president and vice-president are unique as leaders of the executive branch, in that their
previous national political experience existed almost exclusively in the United States
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Senate, where multiple opportunities existed to express their views on constitutional
war powers. An understanding of their previous political background and positions on
war powers may be useful in shaping and explaining how they perceive the appropriate balance of power now at the White House. Given that Congressman Richard
Cheney’s views on war powers comported closely with his positions as Secretary
of Defense and Vice President of the United States, the approach used in this research
may give insight on what may be expected in this new administration. The article also
provides a brief assessment of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s view on war
powers when she served in the US Senate. These analyses are followed with examinations of the Obama administration’s military actions in Afghanistan and the
Department of Defense’s use of force against Somali pirates.
Although it is early in the Obama administration, these first military actions indicate that despite Obama’s and Biden’s records in the Senate of supporting meaningful
congressional checks on the commander in chief, that old patterns are difficult to
break; the commander in chief is leading, with limited engagement from Congress.
Obama’s and Biden’s past actions in the Senate do not appear to be good indicators
of their current practices in the White House. Their previous views on congressional
war powers are not, at least from these first military decisions, the guiding constitutional principles that shape their relationship with the Congress. Much as for previous presidents, assertiveness as commander in chief is an institutional pattern in
the conduct of the executive branch.
Moreover, Congress generally continues to defer to the commander in chief, and partisan politics do not capture this element of executive legislative relations. In the era
following the Second World War, American presidents have increasingly asserted
wide military powers, as Congress has ceded much of its war powers authority to the president, which the American public seems to often accept and is evident again in the
Obama presidency. These patterns comport with most literature on presidential war
powers, and also indicate that similar to the Bush presidency, the centre of decisionmaking for American military policy is the White House and not the American Congress.
Constitutional War Powers and George W. Bush as Commander in Chief
Much of the recent scholarship on the administration of congressional war powers
during the presidency of George W. Bush suggests that this era differed substantially
from the principles created by America’s constitutional framers on the decision to use
force abroad. The Constitution provides the president the power to act as the country’s commander in chief, but this power was balanced by a long list of congressional
powers that speak directly to the use of force abroad. These powers include the
powers to declare war, to provide for the common defence, to grant letters of
marque and reprisals, to provide and maintain a navy, to suppress insurrections
and repel invasions, and to raise and support armies.3 When discussing these
powers, especially the power to declare war, James Madison’s notes on the constitutional convention make it clear that the constitutional framers believed that the
president may use force unilaterally only to ‘repel sudden attacks’. Otherwise the
use of force required congressional approval.4
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The history of the constitutional ratification debates is similarly clear. Analysts
have identified many instances when the framers and their supporters confirmed
the understanding reached at the constitutional convention: war could not be
entered into solely through a decision from the executive branch
legislative
approval was required. The commander in chief was not permitted to act in the
same manner as the British monarch, who could take his country to war at will.5
For much of the 19th century and through nearly half of the 20th century, presidents tended to respect this basic understanding of checks and balances. In the years
before the Second World War, Congress was considered by many presidents as the
ultimate ‘decider’ in determining if and when force would be used. In the majority
of instances, presidents respected Congress’s war powers and actively sought legislative approval prior to the use of military force.6
With the onset of the Cold War, many analysts agree that Congress began the
practice of deferring to presidential military ambitions by granting the commander
in chief considerable leeway to defend the United States against perceived communist
threats. At the same time, presidents began to make more expansive unilateral assertions of their war powers, such that Congress’s war powers became much less meaningful in restraining American commanders in chief.7 Even in the context of the
Clinton presidency, in which a chief executive faced an ostensibly assertive Republican Congress for the last six years of his presidency, and in an environment in which
the president did not have good political standing with the American military, Bill
Clinton was still able to make unilateral assertions of power as commander in
chief, which Congress largely accepted.8
Within this recent historical context, during the administration of George W. Bush
the executive branch similarly made bold assertions of its alleged power to use force
abroad. Although Congress specifically granted Bush broad military discretion for its
global war on terrorism and later for the war in Iraq, many elements of the executive
congressional interplay are illustrative of a commander in chief who sought few
restrictions on his perceived authority to use force abroad.9 For example, in the
lead-up to the war in Iraq, the Bush administration initially maintained that while
they would consult Congress before a war, they did not need congressional approval
to use force against Saddam Hussein.10 Upon considerable pressure from Congress, a
vote to use force eventually occurred. Yet Congress’s checking and oversight role
here was quite limited, and through its own legislative efforts, ceded the actual
decision on whether or not to use force to the president at his own determination.11
Bush also made extensive claims as commander in chief in the American deployment
of troops to Haiti in late February 2004 as part of a UN peacekeeping operation. Few
members of Congress questioned the president on the decision to deploy these troops,
and no legislative effort was made to challenge Bush’s asserted authority to send
American troops abroad into a civil conflict where conditions were far from stable.12
One final example of Congress’s willingness to defer to presidential wishes was
evident when the Democrats gained majority status in the House of Representatives
and the Senate after the 2006 mid-term elections. After campaigning nationally for an
end to the American military presence in Iraq, and highlighting the faulty claims
advanced by the Bush administration to justify the war, the Democratic-led Congress
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then funded Bush’s 20,000-person troop surge in Iraq, which in many respects,
directly contrasted with the Democrats’ electoral promises. Certainly, the congressional Democrats expressed their concerns with Bush’s 2007 troop surge.13 Yet
with the Democrats leading the Congress, the ‘Out of Iraq’ caucus contained only
a third of House Democrats, and while vocal, they were able to do little to prevent
the Democratic leadership, along with the Republican rank-and-file from supporting
and financing President Bush’s new plan to intensify the war in Iraq.14
To summarize, the vast majority of past and current research on American constitutional war powers maintains that presidents have often acted unilaterally with
regard to their perceived powers as commander in chief, and Congress has largely
deferred to presidential leadership for major use-of-force decisions, including the
decision of whether or not to use force abroad.15 Some recent scholarship,
however, maintains that Congress is far more significant in exercising its war
powers than previously maintained. By some accounts, Congress is highly partisan
on foreign affairs and will wage partisan challenges on the commander in chief’s
asserted authority to use force abroad, which at times may result in significant limitations on the president.16 Nonetheless, it seems evident that one clear legacy of
George W. Bush’s presidency is that of a commander in chief who was able to
make wide claims of military power and authority as Congress continued to
support Bush’s military endeavours, even at times when public opinion poll
numbers were abysmally low for the president.17 It is this context that Barack
Obama and Joe Biden inherited their positions at the White House, which appears
ripe for a period of strong leadership as exercised by the commander in chief.
Joseph Biden and War Powers
Joe Biden was first elected to the United States Senate in 1972, where he remained
until his service as vice president. It is first notable that Biden became vice president
in an era when the office has gained new prominence in shaping both American
domestic and international policy. Since the vice presidency of Walter Mondale
through the vice presidency of Richard Cheney, this office has grown in saliency
and responsibilities within the executive branch.18 Recent journalistic findings in
this early phase of the Obama presidency suggest that Biden has some degree of
independent influence within the administration, especially international affairs.19
In addition, one of Biden’s major areas of interest while serving for over three
decades in the United States Senate was American foreign policy. Upon his election
as vice president, Biden held the chairmanship of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. For all of these reasons, it seems legitimate and relevant to the
current presidency to understand Vice President Biden’s previously expressed
views on war powers and the constitutional authority to use force abroad.
Senator Biden on Constitutional War Powers
Among American senators, Joe Biden was especially well versed on constitutional
war powers, which was evident through an array speeches provided on the Senate
floor, his service on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, his introduced
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legislation aimed at limiting presidential military actions, and his published scholarship on this issue. Biden has a long record of advocating for congressional war
powers and the notion that presidents may not use force without congressional
approval. At the same time, however, Biden also has argued that there are exceptions
when the commander in chief may use force without congressional authorization, and
has supported some unilateral military actions by presidents, which results in a somewhat inconsistent record on this issue.
The most substantive legislative example of Biden’s interest in war powers is
evident through his proposed Use of Force Act. This proposal stems from his participation on the Special Committee on War Powers, which was established in 1987 by
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and was partly in response to the Reagan
administration’s decision to place Kuwaiti oil tankers under the protection of an
American flag in 1987 without congressional consultation. More generally at the
time, some members of Congress had grown increasingly concerned about the expansion of power exercised by the commander in chief and the perceived failures and
limitations of the War Powers Resolution.20
In explaining much of the logic for his legislative proposal, Biden co-authored a
law review article on the topic, which demonstrated a detailed and historically
grounded understanding of war powers, including a discussion of James Madison’s
Notes of Debates of the Federal Convention in 1787, where Madison wrote that a commander in chief may only use force independently to ‘repel sudden attacks’. Otherwise,
as Biden wrote, congressional approval to use force was required.21 In addition,
Biden’s article made references to early American presidents, who stated clearly
that force may not be used without legislative approval. Moreover, Biden discussed
two key United States Supreme Court cases, Bas v. Tingy (1800) and Talbot
v. Seeman (1801) that built upon the understanding that congressional approval was
required for essentially the full gamut of American military engagements. Biden and
his co-author also cited President James Buchanan’s views on war powers: ‘Without
the authority of Congress the President cannot fire a hostile gun in any case except
to repel the attacks of an enemy.’22
In his discussion of this history of war powers, Biden also established an understanding of other perspectives on war powers, including the view that a president may
use force without congressional approval. He and his co-author referred to these
claims as the ‘monarchist’ perspective, which evolved and emboldened the commander in chief after the Second World War, as Congress retreated from exercising meaningful checks on the president in the face of communism. Biden’s academic views
square with the majority of scholars who have published on war powers, and in
doing so, he and his co-author demonstrate a considerable familiarity with major
scholarly works on war powers that is uncommon for an American senator.
In his proposed Use of Force Act, Biden called for a joint decision framework,
such that the president is required to consult with Congress prior to and during the
use of force abroad. Biden made the case that ‘joint deliberation’ fosters American
national security interests. In this proposal, Biden addressed five military situations
when the commander in chief would be permitted to use force without congressional
consultation or approval. These situations include the ability to repel an armed attack,
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the right to respond to a ‘foreign military threat that threatens the supreme national
interest under the United States under emergency conditions’ that does not permit
time for congressional consultation; the ability to rescue citizens abroad from
emergency situations; the ability to ‘forestall an imminent act of international
terrorism’ directed at the United States; and to protect the rights of ‘innocent and
free passage in the air and seas’.23
Soon after the publication of his war powers law review article in 1988, Biden
also suggested that the president may also use force as long as a UN Security
Council resolution existed and Congress had been consulted.24 Biden later included
this exception in his 1992 Use of Force Act proposal,25 but in the lead-up to the war
resolution vote on the first Persian Gulf War in 1991, Biden argued that President
Bush did not have authority to use force in Iraq, despite the Security Council’s
approval. He noted that ‘The choice to go to war remains with the Congress, and
the Congress alone, as it always does.’26 The Security Council exception for the
president, however, did not appear in his 1995 or 1998 proposals.27
In many respects, the situations that Biden discussed permit the president to use
force quite liberally and allow substantial room for the commander in chief to interpret when and how to use force. In this regard, this proposal could be fairly criticized
for granting substantial war powers to the commander in chief, and thus further distancing the Congress from its constitutional duty to check the president. His interest
in allowing the commander in chief to use force with Security Council authorization,
but without congressional approval also contradicts the legislative history of
American membership in the UN, which protected Congress’s war powers.28
At the same time, the root principle that Biden forwarded centred on the notion
of shared presidential and congressional responsibility to determine when force
may be used. When the president is permitted to act without congressional approval
in Biden’s proposal, most of these conditions involve ‘emergency’ situations.
Without an emergency, congressional consultation is required, although Biden
does not specifically require congressional approval. In order to foster such consultation and to require meaningful dialogue between the congress and commander in
chief, Biden called for the creation of a ‘Congressional Leadership Group’ consisting
of House and Senate leaders from both parties. This group would meet periodically to
encourage sustained consultations between the commander in chief and key foreign
policy and intelligence officials in the executive branch.29
While Biden’s proposal is unquestionably open to criticism from those who argue
for greater congressional involvement in use of force decisions, it is clear that his
proposal seeks to move away from what he views as the ‘monarchist’ practices of
the commander in chief, and that enhanced congressional involvement in military
decisions is both constitutional and useful in terms of political practice. In this
respect, Biden seems to recognize the value and appropriateness of congressional
involvement in what he would likely view as ‘non-emergency’ military situations,
and that the president is not permitted to assert unilateral decision-making authority
for warfare.
Apart from Biden’s scholarly writings and his Use of Force Act proposals, over the
course of his Senate career Biden took a number of positions on presidential military
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actions that provide additional insight on his views on war powers. In a number of
military actions, he called for prior congressional input and approval before a commander in chief may use force. Biden was an early supporter of Senator Jacob
Javits’ (Republican, New York State) efforts to revise the war powers arrangement
and was a co-sponsor of Javits’ efforts in 1973 to encourage the Senate to take up
what eventually became the War Powers Resolution.30 In the first term of Ronald
Reagan’s presidency, Biden was also quite clear in calling for the application of the
War Powers Resolution to the American troop deployment to Lebanon. In doing so,
Biden clearly expressed his support for a congressional role in determining whether
or not troops should remain deployed abroad in this peacekeeping mission.31 In referencing the specific language of the War Powers Resolution, well before the suicide
truck bombing that took 241 American lives, Biden noted:
when the marines were sent as part of the multinational force, I believe they
were entering into an area of hostilities. Some disagreed with that assertion
of mine back then in the Foreign Relations Committee, but I think they are
hostilities. And I think the War Powers Act should have been triggered immediately and have so stated in the past.32
Biden made a nearly identical argument in 1984 when debate arose in Congress
over President Reagan’s deployment of American troops to El Salvador. Biden was
again clear in this case, noting that ‘The President does not have the authority to make
war, he has the authority to conduct a war. A Commander in Chief does not initiate a
war, he conducts a war.’ In the same speech, in calling for congressional oversight of
the commander in chief, Biden pleaded with the president to ‘Let us be part of what is
our constitutional obligation’.33
On Reagan’s troop deployment to Grenada in 1983, which occurred without congressional consultation and has largely been viewed as a unilateral American troop
deployment by the commander in chief, Biden supported the president’s actions in
this case, noting that based on the intelligence briefing he had received, the president
was justified to act.34 Thus, across these three cases in the Reagan administration,
Biden’s record on war powers is mixed. At times, he quite forcefully advocated Congress’s war powers authority when other members of Congress said little, but on
Reagan’s military operation in Grenada he supported the unilateral action conducted
by the commander in chief.35 Biden also sought to invoke the War Powers Resolution, whose critics note may empower the commander in chief, but also referenced
the War Powers Resolution in an effort to rein in American military deployments.
In other presidential administrations, Biden has a similar record in calling for congressional checks on the commander in chief, which is evident during the presidency
of George H.W. Bush. Biden argued against empowering Bush militarily prior to the
use of force in Panama in 1989.36 In addition, Biden was clear in calling for meaningful legislative actions to limit Bush prior to Operation Desert Storm. In the
lead-up to the 1991 war in Iraq, while expressing his position and views on the limitations on the commander in chief, Biden referenced founding fathers James Madison,
Elbridge Gerry, and Alexander Hamilton, who in Biden’s historical recollection were
quite specific: ‘The real issue was authorization of war, which the framers did not
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intend to give to the President.’37 Biden openly challenged President Bush’s perspective that the commander in chief was constitutionally permitted to use force against
Saddam Hussein without congressional approval.38
When the Senate conducted its final debates over whether or not to support President Bush’s desire to use force in Iraq in 1991, Biden spoke at length regarding his
opposition to the view that a president could independently initiate military action.
Quite poignantly, Biden stated:
On this point the Constitution is as clear as it is plain. While article II of the
Constitution gives the President the power to command our troops, article I
of the Constitution commits to Congress and Congress alone the power
to decide if this Nation will go to war. The Framers of our Constitution took
great pains to ensure that the Government they established for us would
differ from the rule of the British monarchs. They knew firsthand of the consequences of leaving the choice between war and peace to one man.39
When the civil conflict in Bosnia erupted in 1992, Biden was quick to voice his
support for military action to prevent additional atrocities in the Balkans, but also
called upon Congress to exercise its constitutional powers to authorize American
military action prior to American military engagement. While nearing a congressional adjournment for the 1992 fall elections, and while simultaneously encouraging
the UN Security Council to authorize the creation of no-fly zones in Bosnia that
would also permit military enforcement of such zones, Biden introduced a resolution
that called upon the Senate to support military action if necessary. He noted, ‘I
believe Congress should as a matter of policy and as a matter of constitutional
principle act to provide such authority before adjournment.’40 In this case, Biden
demonstrated his willingness to use force as well as his respect for Congress’s role
in military decisions for the United States.
During the Clinton administration, Biden is remembered for being a strong advocate of American and NATO military intervention in the Balkans, and for his support
of military strikes against Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic.41 At the same
time, Biden argued that President Clinton ‘and the Presidents under whom I have
served have all misread the Constitution’, through assertions as commander in
chief that were not intended by the constitutional framers. In the Clinton administration, Biden advocated greater limitations on presidential war powers in the aftermath of the crisis in Somalia in 1993, in the lead-up to the American troop
deployment to Haiti in 1994, and through his references to his Use of Force Act.42
In the hours prior to NATO’s air strikes on Milosevic in 1999, Biden led the floor
debate in calling for the Senate’s authorization approval for Clinton’s requested
action, noting after the vote’s conclusion that ‘I do not think the President has the
authority to use force in this nature without our approval’.43 While it is clear that
Biden favoured military action and took hawkish views during the Clinton presidency
regarding the Balkan crises, he also demonstrated a non-partisan interest in protecting
and asserting Congress’s war powers. Yet Biden did not actively oppose presidential
military actions that were not authorized by Congress, and certainly in Bosnia in 1995
and Kosovo in 1999, quite actively backed the president when force was used.44
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In the presidency of George W. Bush, Biden’s record is again mixed. In the
limited discussion that took place prior to Congress’s vote to authorize President
Bush’s ‘global war on terrorism’ after the 11 September strikes, Biden acknowledged
that Congress had provided wide latitude in permitting the president to wage a military response to those involved in the terrorist strikes on the United States. Yet he also
noted that Congress had actually checked the president by not extending him powers
to ‘deter and preempt any future acts of terrorism against the United States’, which
the White House had originally requested in its discussions with the members of Congress. While Congress did grant President Bush extremely wide authority to use
force, which Biden supported, Biden still referenced the constitutional limitations
on the president and his opposition to ‘extend these authorities’, e.g. those proposed
by the White House, which is notable given how few others even raised the issue of
Congress’s constitutional checking role during this crisis.45
On the resolution to grant President Bush authority to use force in 2002 against
Iraq, Biden’s focus was primarily on stating that he did not support a doctrine of military preemption. His record on this vote provides contradictory evidence regarding
his previous views on war powers. Biden voted for one of Senator Robert Byrd’s
(Democrat, West Virginia) amendments which called for more deliberation and
opposition to Bush’s foreign policy direction to Iraq. One of Byrd’s amendments
placed a limitation on the authorization to use force to one year, which failed in
the Senate. In making his arguments for supporting the amendment, Biden noted
that during war, Congress’s power of the purse is difficult to invoke against the president, and thus Byrd’s proposal was useful in limiting the president’s military
powers. Biden was one of only 31 senators who voted for this resolution.46 In this
respect, Biden voted to permit a congressional checking role, and more generally,
Biden was part of the deliberative political process that determined the merits of
President Bush’s movement toward war.
Biden, however, did not support Senator Carl Levin’s (Democrat, Michgan)
amendment to require the president to return to the Congress after President Bush
sought UN Security Council approval for military action. Biden argued that it was
sufficient to grant the commander in chief discretion at that time to use force if
necessary, whether or not Security Council authorization was gained.47 Moreover,
in the key and final vote on the authorization to use force, Biden voted with 76
other senators to grant the president wide authority to determine if military force
against Saddam Hussein was merited or not.48 Biden’s support for this resolution contrasts with his past statements on Congress’s war powers authority, given his longstanding rhetoric in favour of Congress’s role in determining if military action was
an appropriate policy step, rather than granting presidential discretion in determining
if force should be used.
In sum, Biden’s Senate record on war powers is mixed. While it is clear that in
many instances Biden advocated for Congress’s war powers, the constitutional
framers’ belief in checks and balances on the commander in chief, and ‘joint deliberation’ between the president and Congress prior to the use of force, he also supported commanders in chief who used force without congressional authorization.
His support for Reagan’s actions in Grenada, his backing of the Clinton
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administration’s strikes in Bosnia and Kosovo, and his previous interest in supporting
a commander in chief who had gained Security Council approval without congressional approval results in an inconsistent record. His proposed ‘Use of Force Act’
also invites the same kinds of problems faced by the War Powers Resolution,
where presidents may use semantic distinctions to avoid congressional oversight
and limitations on the commander in chief.49 Unlike many members of the modern
Congress, however, what is clear is that Biden has demonstrated a well-grounded historical knowledge of war powers, and on a number of occasions has sought legislative
remedies aimed at ending the practice of a ‘monarchist’ presidency who alone determines if and when force will be used abroad.
Barack Obama and War Powers
In contrast to Vice President Joe Biden’s history on war powers, President Obama’s
record on this subject is much less extensive. It is, however, clear that Obama does
not hold what Biden would call a ‘monarchist’ view regarding the authority of the
commander in chief. Obama believes that Congress is constitutionally permitted
and justified to challenge the president during war. In this section, the analysis will
focus on Obama’s views on war powers as a senator, as president-elect, and on his
first actions and practices as commander in chief.
Senator and President-elect Obama
After his successful 2004 campaign bid to become the junior senator from Illinois,
Obama did not speak often about the appropriate constitutional balance of powers
between the Congress and the commander in chief, or in a substantive manner
about his preferred strategy for Iraq.50 Obama’s views on President Bush’s policies
toward Iraq, however, developed in late 2006 and more so in 2007 when Bush proposed and eventually implemented his troop surge strategy.
The first major signs of Obama’s willingness to challenge the commander in chief
came in November 2006, when from the campaign trail, Obama called for a new strategic direction for Iraq. On war authority related to appropriations powers during the
war, Obama maintained:
Congress has given the Administration unprecedented flexibility in determining
how to spend more than 20 billion dollars in Iraq . . . This must end in the next
session of Congress, when we assert our authority to oversee the management
of this war.51
In this case, Obama’s views indicate a belief that Congress can influence how a war is
waged, which certainly goes beyond the notion that Congress can only check the president prior to the initiation of warfare. Obama indicates here a willingness to check
the president on the actual conduct of a war.
With new democratic majorities in the House and Senate in 2007 after the
midterm elections, Obama continued to elaborate on his views regarding Congress’s
ability to manage the war in Iraq, and in particular, what he viewed as Congress’s
legitimate role to prevent additional troops from being deployed without
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congressional approval. As Bush’s troop surge plan became evident, Obama noted, ‘It
now falls on Congress to find a way to support our troops in the field while still preventing the President from multiplying his previous mistakes.’52 Obama expanded
upon these remarks on the Senate floor, noting ‘I said publicly that it is my preference
not to micromanage the Commander-in-Chief in the prosecution of war. Ultimately, I
do not believe that it is the ideal role for Congress to play. But at a certain point, we
have to draw a line.’53
Obama was later equally explicit about Congress’s role in shaping American war
decisions when he proposed major troop reductions to Iraq, and expressed his opposition to Bush’s troop surge proposals. For example, in arguing that President Bush
had failed in Iraq, Senator Obama argued, ‘That is why Congress now has the duty
to prevent even more mistakes.’ In this same address, he added that under his proposal, Bush would not be permitted to deploy additional troops to Iraq ‘without explicit
authorization by the Congress’.54 Both comments clearly suggest meaningful ways in
which Congress can influence war and provide a check on the commander in chief,
both on how a war was wage and whether more troops could be introduced into
warfare. When he was queried on the constitutionality of his proposals, Obama
added that Congress’s 2002 authorization to use force in Iraq did not permit President
Bush total and absolute discretion in determining war policies. He remarked, ‘The
notion that as a consequence of that authorization, the president can continue down
a failed path without any constraints from Congress whatsoever is wrong and is
not warranted by our Constitution.’55
It is notable that Hillary Clinton’s war powers record in the US Senate is not dramatically different from Senator Obama’s. In the Senate, Clinton’s most aggressive
assertions of congressional war powers came during her presidential campaign. As
an incoming member of the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2007, Clinton
noted that she would provide ‘stronger oversight in order to change our failed
policy in Iraq’.56 Moreover, on the Bush administration’s concerns over Iran, she
stated: ‘If the administration believes that any any use of force against Iran is
necessary, the President must come to Congress to seek that authority.’57 Thus,
like Obama, Hillary Clinton was equally explicit and clear regarding Congress’s
war powers, oversight, and decision-making authority for the use of force.
As president-elect, Obama took one step that may suggest some interest in constitutional war powers. On 12 December 2008, Obama met with former Secretaries
of State James A. Baker and Warren Christopher, the two leading voices of the
2008 National Commission on War Powers, to ostensibly discuss their proposal.
At the meeting’s conclusion, Obama made no public statement, although Obama
spokesman, Denis McDonough, who now serves at the Director for Strategic Communications for the National Security Council noted:
President-elect Obama expressed his appreciation for their work and said he
would review the commission’s proposal The president-elect underscored his
commitment to working closely with Congress with bipartisan participation.58
Although Obama and McDonough were clearly non-committal, the decision to grant
a meeting with Christopher and Warren suggested some willingness to at least discuss
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the proposal, which at its core is intended to make the decision to use force abroad
shared more equally between Congress and the commander in chief.59
President Obama
As commander in chief, there are at least two instances of military action that provide
some insight on the Obama administration’s perception of presidential war powers.
These initial snapshots of Obama’s brief tenure as commander in chief include his
new policies toward Afghanistan, and his decision to allow the US Navy to use
force against Somali pirates. In both cases, the Obama administration’s actions
suggest the beginnings of a presidency that will follow along similar lines of
conduct as previous commanders in chief, in which presidents have asserted broad
powers when using force abroad, and to some extent contrast with Obama’s,
Biden’s, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s previously stated views on war
powers.
Afghanistan
It was clear from early in his administration that Obama would approach Afghanistan
differently from his predecessor. Within weeks of his inauguration, on 17 February,
Obama announced his plans to send a Marine expeditionary brigade and an Army
Stryker Brigade to Afghanistan at the request of Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates and General David McKiernan, the commanding officer then in Afghanistan.60
This policy was reached without any measurable public debate in Congress.
Approximately one month later, Obama announced his plans to significantly
revise the American war strategy in Afghanistan, which included his plans to
deploy 17,000 additional American combat forces and 4,000 military advisors to
Afghanistan. In announcing his plans, Obama noted the existing bipartisan support
for his current efforts. In doing so, Obama called upon the Congress to approve of
a bill sponsored by Senators John Kerry (Democrat, Massachusetts) and Richard
Lugar (Republican, Indian) to authorize a $1.5 billion spending increase every year
for five consecutive years to Pakistan. He also noted his support for a bill proposed
by Senator Maria Cantwell (Democrat, Washington state) and Representatives
Chris Van Hollen (Democrat, Maryland) and Peter Hoekstra (Republican, Michigan)
to provide additional economic assistance to Afghanistan.61 The extent to which these
members influenced President Obama and his senior advisors, if at all, is not clear,
but at minimum indicates that some members of Congress were in synch with the
administration’s efforts from the start.
In the aftermath of this proposal, Obama received what he sought from Congress
with little opposition. The House approved of Obama’s request in a 368-60 vote, with
51 Democrats voting against the proposal. The Senate unanimously approved of the
Kerry-Lugar proposal.62 While there is a small minority of House Democrats who
raised concerns over Obama’s plans, even the most vocal antiwar critics of the
Bush administration have found it difficult to generate similar levels of criticism
for President Obama. The Out of Iraq Caucus, the most assertive group of critics
of George W. Bush’s war policies, has not transferred its criticism to Obama and
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his new war strategy in Afghanistan, and by some accounts, has been ‘largely silent’
on Obama’s Afghan troop increase.63
Obama did not inform or notify members of Congress of his administration’s new
military approach to Afghanistan through a specific letter to congressional leaders,
though in a letter to congressional leaders in June 2009 regarding all American
combat-deployed troops, Obama justified his administration’s actions in Afghanistan
and all other combat operations through his powers ‘pursuant to my constitutional
authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States and as Commander
in Chief and Chief Executive’, which is the same language used by Obama’s most
recent predecessors regarding American military conduct abroad.64 Given that the
authorization to use force in Afghanistan on 15 September 2001 was so broad, a
strong case can be made that Obama is acting within his constitutional authority as
commander in chief in his troop decision, and in that respect, large-scale congressional involvement may not necessarily be expected.
At the same time, in 2009 many analysts concluded that the mission in Afghanistan was failing.65 In using the previous standard that Obama and Hillary Clinton
applied to President Bush in 2007, congressional authorization for this troop surge
is a possible response that the administration may have sought from Congress.
Much like President Bush, however, the Obama administration did not call for a
congressional vote for this combat troop escalation. The ground conditions in Iraq
and Afghanistan are clearly different, and the specific authorizations for the uses
of force in Afghanistan and Iraq are also different with Afghanistan being much
broader in scope
but in both cases thousands of troops were added to combat
missions that were widely viewed as failures, and thus contains some of the
parameters for when Obama previously called for congressional authorization
before the commander in chief could proceed. Nonetheless, while some debate
over certain aspects of Obama’s new foreign policy direction in Afghanistan exists
in Congress, the President’s decision to place 21,000 more American forces in
Afghanistan received little legislative criticism, and in essence, was a fait accompli
by mid-summer 2009.66
Obama’s second troop surge decision entailed the deployment of 30,000
additional troops as well as 7,000 additional forces from the NATO allies. By midspring 2010, nearly 90,000 troops from 45 states were contributing to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, of which approximately
39,000 were non-American.67 Obama announced the new policy after nine ‘war
council’ meetings and extensive public lobbying by General McKiernan’s successor,
General Stanley McChrystal. Again, the new policy was made with limited congressional involvement, or anywhere near what Joe Biden would portray in the past as
‘joint deliberation’ between the branches. While it is clear that Senator John Kerry
played an important diplomatic role for the Obama administration after the flawed
Afghan national elections, and encouraged a re-evaluation of American military
policy in the region, journalistic accounts of key decision moments during the
entire war council evaluation period indicate that ‘The White House spent little
time courting Congress’ and that ‘no overtures were made to party leaders’. It does
appear that White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel was in close contact with
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Senator Lindsey Graham (Republican, South Carolina), but otherwise members of
Congress were not included in Obama’s key war council debates over how to
handle Afghanistan.68
Along with President Obama’s two troop surges, it is notable how little congressional discussion has occurred over Obama’s use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(UAV) bombings in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which have increased substantially
during his presidency.69 Members of Congress have publicly raised few qualms
with these strikes. Other than the effort led by Congressman Dennis Kucinich (Democrat, Ohio) in March 2010 that called for the withdrawal of American troops from
Afghanistan and gathered votes from only 50 House democrats and five republicans,
most members of Congress have rallied behind Obama’s heightened war efforts.70
Again, Obama’s central congressional critics are a small number of House Democrats; Republicans have otherwise provided nearly universal support for the war
strategy.
In sum, many members of Congress have expressed their views on Obama’s military efforts in Afghanistan, and some, notably Senators Kerry and Graham, may have
exercised some influence on the war strategy. Yet it is also clear that Obama’s leadership on this war suggests that his administration, much like his previous commanders
in chief, will assert strong military powers, which to some extent contrasts with
Obama’s, Biden’s, and Hillary Clinton’s views while in the US Senate. Moreover,
Congress, in a generally bipartisan fashion, has supported the Obama administration’s new war aims and strategy for Afghanistan with little controversy.
Somali Piracy
Regarding the actions of the US Navy Seals that resulted in the killing of three Somali
pirates, there is little evidence to suggest that Congress had any role in the actual
decision to use force. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted that after the
pirates captured Captain Richard Phillips on 8 April 2009 the Pentagon made two
requests to use force. Two requests were made because of the different nature of
the special operations forces that had been sent to the region, each of which required
its own set of authority to act. Gates noted that in both cases, the White House gave
approval for the action ‘virtually immediately’, which suggests a high probability that
the decision-making occurred exclusively at the White House.71
In describing the actual use force, which included three separate bullet shots
against three separate pirates, Vice Admiral William Gortney noted that the authority
given to use force indicated ‘that at any time the on-scene commander felt that
Captain Phillips’ life was in danger that they could take action’ and that ‘our authorities came directly from the president’.72 After force had been used and Phillips
successfully returned to the USS Boxer, Obama released a press statement that
applauded Captain Phillips’ bravery and the actions of the American military. In
his statement, Obama did not make reference to his constitutional powers as commander in chief. Nor did he inform Congress of this military action in writing.73
Implicitly, it is clear that Obama saw this action within his constitutional authority,
and given that no letter was provided to Congress to explain the military action, it
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seems that the administration viewed the action as so self-evidently a presidential
power that a formal explanation was unnecessary.
Certainly, a strong case can be made that an American’s life was in danger, and
that the emergency situation required immediate defensive action. In addition, military actions against pirates, within the context of international law, have generally
been viewed as defensive, especially when the use of force has been limited and
proportional.74 Moreover, the United Nations Security Council had specifically authorized ‘all necessary measures’ to permit military actions against Somalia pirates in
both June 2008 and December 2008, which provides additional international legal
justification for this action.75
At the same time, the Constitution gives Congress the power to ‘To define and
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas’.76 This power has rarely
been considered since the first decades of the American republic, but clearly empowers Congress to act if such a threat would arise. Perhaps the most well-known case of
pirating and the American response is President Thomas Jefferson’s actions against
pirates from Tripoli in 1801. While some debate exists over the constitutionality of
Jefferson’s actions, which resulted in strikes against pirates and the sinking of a
pirate ship, it has been argued that the Jefferson administration acted with congressional approval.77 Other analysts of Jefferson’s actions maintain that he had actually
approved of offensive military actions against the pirates to be used at the naval commander’s discretion, and that Jefferson had not been completely truthful with the US
Congress regarding his instructions to the Navy, which went beyond simple defensive
measures to protect American shipping in the Mediterranean.78
Regardless of the different interpretations and emphases historians have placed on
Jefferson’s actions, a case can be made that Congress had provided Jefferson some
degree of prior authority to act to protect American commerce in the region. It is
also indisputable that Jefferson returned to Congress after the initial military
actions and sought additional legislative approval for military actions against the
pirates. Regarding the next possible military step, Jefferson noted, ‘in the exercise
of this important function confided by the Constitution to the Legislature exclusively
their judgement may form itself on a knowledge and consideration of every circumstance of weight’.79
President James Monroe similarly noted restrictions on his power as commander
in chief against pirates, and requested congressional guidance on the extent of how
aggressively the United States should pursue pirates in 1824. Monroe stated to Congress, ‘Whether those robbers should be pursued on the land, the local authorities be
made responsible for these atrocities, or any other measure be resorted to suppress
them, is submitted to the consideration of Congress.’80
Certainly, it is difficult to draw close parallels to Jefferson’s and Monroe’s battles
with pirates and Obama’s actions. Yet, Congress had not specifically approved of the
broader American presence in the region to engage in anti-pirating police actions.
Nonetheless, the United States already had American battleships in Somali coastal
waters as part of a NATO anti-piracy mission. The alliance had conducted these
operations in the last three months of the Bush administration. In March 2009, this
mission recommenced once Obama was in office and well before the hostage crisis
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with Captain Phillips. NATO had already approved of Operation Allied Protector,
which consisted of five naval war ships, including the USS Halyburton.81 The USS
Bainbridge was also in these waters at the time of the attack. In this regard, the
Obama administration had already defined the American response to the pirates, independent of congressional input. There is also little evidence to indicate that Obama
consulted with members of Congress prior to the use of force. And unlike President
Jefferson, Obama has at the time of writing not yet returned to Congress to report on
his military actions and has not sought further guidance on how and if to act militarily
against the pirates, as Jefferson and Madison did.
Moreover, it seems clear that the world’s major powers wanted specific international legal authority to act against the pirates, which suggests that the existing
laws of military action against piracy are not clear, and that specific UN Security
Council action was then believed to be necessary. Yet, a Security Council Resolution
alone does not authorize the president to take military measures independent of
congressional authorization.82
Soon after the strikes, the House of Representatives applauded the conduct of the
American navy and of Captain Phillips; members of Congress refrained from any
constitutional critique of Obama for his actions.83 While this use of force does not
perfectly represent a case of presidential imperialism, it is certainly clear that presidential leadership and congressional deference again generally explain this action,
which does not perfectly comport with the constitution, given Congress’s explicit
powers on piracy and the larger American naval presence in this region of the
Indian Ocean in the absence of congressional approval. In addition, little evidence
exists for Joe Biden’s previously preferred ‘joint decision’ framework for the
making of the broader American policy for dealing with Somali pirates.
Conclusion
As senators, Joe Biden, Barack Obama, and Hillary Clinton had records of advocating
Congress’s war powers. Among American senators over the last three decades, Joe
Biden is unique in his frequent calls for war powers reforms, his historical knowledge
of war powers, and for his non-partisan calls for enhanced checks on ‘monarchical’
commanders in chief. At the same time, he has also supported unilateral actions by
the commander in chief. Obama’s and Hillary Clinton’s record on this issue are
more limited given their much shorter tenures in the Senate, but nonetheless still indicate a history of favouring congressional actions that can restrict a commander in
chief. These constitutional views stand in strong contrast to presidents since the
Second World War, who have generally invoked unilateral claims as commander in
chief. In many respects, Biden’s, Clinton’s, and Obama’s views in the Senate are
different from previous commanders in chief, and indicate a more balanced constitutional perspective that permits checks and balances when force may be used abroad.
Now in the White House, however, some early signs suggest that this administration is conducting itself similarly to previous commanders in chief, which makes
its military decisions with limited substantive consultation or input from Congress.
Congress also appears to be settling into deferential behaviour, following the lead of
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the Obama administration through its support of Obama’s military actions. This
research comports with much of the previous scholarship on war powers, which indicates that the commander in chief dominates the American military policy-making
process, as the vast majority of Congress defers to presidential leadership. The findings
presented here also suggest a lack of congressional partisanship on war powers, which
contrasts with some current scholarship on Congress’s role in foreign policy and war
powers specifically. Obama’s decision and then eventual use of force against the
Somali pirates generated no congressional backlash from either political party. On
Afghanistan, nearly all members of Congress supported Obama’s first troop surge,
and his second troop surge decision generated only minimal opposition from liberal
congressional Democrats
not Republicans. Congress played very little role in
either troop surge decision, and from an institutional perspective overwhelmingly
backed the president regardless of political party affiliation.
Certainly, the legacy of the George W. Bush administration provides the political
context for such behaviour, as well as the longer history of presidential empowerment
established in the Cold War era. In addition, it appears that Obama’s, Biden’s, and
Hillary Clinton’s previous views on congressional war powers are not, at least
from these first military decisions, the guiding constitutional principles that shape
their relationship with the Congress. Much like Presidents Reagan, Bush, George
H.W. Bush, and Clinton, the pattern of an assertive commander in chief appears to
come with the conduct of the executive branch. At the same time, Congress has
become more and more focused on in-district constituency service and electoral campaign activities. As an institution, the legislative branch spends less and less time in
Washington carrying out legislative and oversight activities, resulting in an abdication of its constitutional duties to check the commander in chief.84 Rather than
serving as a partner in military decisions for the United States, Congress finds
much greater political incentives in placing the responsibility for national security
actions with the commander in chief, which creates an imbalance that favours an
empowered president.
While the United States has not entered a ‘new’ war, which would provide a
clearer test of how the Obama administration views its constitutional authority to
use force, the administration’s actions in Afghanistan and in the Indian Ocean
suggest that the existing pattern of congressional deference and executive military
leadership remains the norm. In this regard, Congress will likely continue to grant
the commander in chief considerable leeway in determining how and when force is
used abroad, and thus is unlikely to change the direction of American military
policy. In an era of pirate-fighting, counter-insurgency operations, and American
military strikes from unmanned aerial vehicles, all of which present complex security
and strategic questions for the United States, the commander in chief and not the
Congress will determine how the United States military is used abroad.
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